Today.Az » Analytics » American Foreign Policy in the Age of Leaks
13 January 2015 [13:38] - Today.Az
By Henry Farrell and Martha Finnemore
The U.S. government seems outraged that
people are leaking classified materials about its less attractive
behavior. It certainly acts that way: three years ago, after Chelsea
Manning, an army private then known as Bradley Manning, turned over
hundreds of thousands of classified cables to the anti-secrecy group
WikiLeaks, U.S. authorities imprisoned the soldier under conditions that
the UN special rapporteur on torture deemed cruel and inhumane. The
Senate’s top Republican, Mitch McConnell, appearing on Meet the Press shortly thereafter, called WikiLeaks’ founder, Julian Assange, “a high-tech terrorist.”
More recently, following the disclosures about U.S. spying programs
by Edward Snowden, a former National Security Agency analyst, U.S.
officials spent a great deal of diplomatic capital trying to convince
other countries to deny Snowden refuge. And U.S. President Barack Obama
canceled a long-anticipated summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin
when he refused to comply.
Despite such efforts, however, the U.S. establishment has often
struggled to explain exactly why these leakers pose such an enormous
threat. Indeed, nothing in the Manning and Snowden leaks should have
shocked those who were paying attention. Former Defense Secretary Robert
Gates, who dissented from the WikiLeaks panic, suggested as much when
he told reporters in 2010 that the leaked information had had only a
“fairly modest” impact and had not compromised intelligence sources or
methods. Snowden has most certainly compromised sources and methods, but
he has revealed nothing that was really unexpected. Before his
disclosures, most experts already assumed that the United States
conducted cyberattacks against China, bugged European institutions, and
monitored global Internet communications. Even his most explosive
revelation -- that the United States and the United Kingdom have
compromised key communications software and encryption systems designed
to protect online privacy and security -- merely confirmed what
knowledgeable observers have long suspected.
The deeper threat that leakers such as Manning and Snowden pose is
more subtle than a direct assault on U.S. national security: they
undermine Washington’s ability to act hypocritically and get away with
it. Their danger lies not in the new information that they reveal but in
the documented confirmation they provide of what the United States is
actually doing and why. When these deeds turn out to clash with the
government’s public rhetoric, as they so often do, it becomes harder for
U.S. allies to overlook Washington’s covert behavior and easier for
U.S. adversaries to justify their own.
Few U.S. officials think of their ability to act hypocritically as a
key strategic resource. Indeed, one of the reasons American hypocrisy is
so effective is that it stems from sincerity: most U.S. politicians do
not recognize just how two-faced their country is. Yet as the United
States finds itself less able to deny the gaps between its actions and
its words, it will face increasingly difficult choices -- and may
ultimately be compelled to start practicing what it preaches. A HYPOCRITICAL HEGEMON Hypocrisy is central to Washington’s soft power -- its ability to get
other countries to accept the legitimacy of its actions -- yet few
Americans appreciate its role. Liberals tend to believe that other
countries cooperate with the United States because American ideals are
attractive and the U.S.-led international system is fair. Realists may
be more cynical, yet if they think about Washington’s hypocrisy at all,
they consider it irrelevant. For them, it is Washington’s cold, hard
power, not its ideals, that encourages other countries to partner with
the United States. Of course, the United States is far from the only hypocrite in
international politics. But the United States’ hypocrisy matters more
than that of other countries. That’s because most of the world today
lives within an order that the United States built, one that is both
underwritten by U.S. power and legitimated by liberal ideas. American
commitments to the rule of law, democracy, and free trade are embedded
in the multilateral institutions that the country helped establish after
World War II, including the World Bank, the International Monetary
Fund, the United Nations, and later the World Trade Organization.
Despite recent challenges to U.S. preeminence, from the Iraq war to the
financial crisis, the international order remains an American one. This system needs the lubricating oil of hypocrisy to keep its gears
turning. To ensure that the world order continues to be seen as
legitimate, U.S. officials must regularly promote and claim fealty to
its core liberal principles; the United States cannot impose its
hegemony through force alone. But as the recent leaks have shown,
Washington is also unable to consistently abide by the values that it
trumpets. This disconnect creates the risk that other states might
decide that the U.S.-led order is fundamentally illegitimate. Of course, the United States has gotten away with hypocrisy for some
time now. It has long preached the virtues of nuclear nonproliferation,
for example, and has coerced some states into abandoning their atomic
ambitions. At the same time, it tacitly accepted Israel’s nuclearization
and, in 2004, signed a formal deal affirming India’s right to civilian
nuclear energy despite its having flouted the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty by acquiring nuclear weapons. In a similar vein, Washington talks
a good game on democracy, yet it stood by as the Egyptian military
overthrew an elected government in July, refusing to call a coup a coup.
Then there’s the “war on terror”: Washington pushes foreign governments
hard on human rights but claims sweeping exceptions for its own
behavior when it feels its safety is threatened. The reason the United States has until now suffered few consequences
for such hypocrisy is that other states have a strong interest in
turning a blind eye. Given how much they benefit from the global public
goods Washington provides, they have little interest in calling the
hegemon on its bad behavior. Public criticism risks pushing the U.S.
government toward self-interested positions that would undermine the
larger world order. Moreover, the United States can punish those who
point out the inconsistency in its actions by downgrading trade
relations or through other forms of direct retaliation. Allies thus
usually air their concerns in private. Adversaries may point fingers,
but few can convincingly occupy the moral high ground. Complaints by
China and Russia hardly inspire admiration for their purer policies. The ease with which the United States has been able to act
inconsistently has bred complacency among its leaders. Since few
countries ever point out the nakedness of U.S. hypocrisy, and since
those that do can usually be ignored, American politicians have become
desensitized to their country’s double standards. But thanks to Manning
and Snowden, such double standards are getting harder and harder to
ignore. THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING EARNEST To see how this dynamic will play out, consider the implications of
Snowden’s revelations for U.S. cybersecurity policy. Until very
recently, U.S. officials did not talk about their country’s offensive
capabilities in cyberspace, instead emphasizing their strategies to
defend against foreign attacks. At the same time, they have made
increasingly direct warnings about Chinese hacking, detailing the threat
to U.S. computer networks and the potential damage to U.S.-Chinese
relations. But the United States has been surreptitiously waging its own major
offensive against China’s computers -- and those of other adversaries --
for some time now. The U.S. government has quietly poured billions of
dollars into developing offensive, as well as defensive, capacities in
cyberspace. (Indeed, the two are often interchangeable -- programmers
who are good at crafting defenses for their own systems know how to
penetrate other people’s computers, too.) And Snowden confirmed that the
U.S. military has hacked not only the Chinese military’s computers but
also those belonging to Chinese cell-phone companies and the country’s
most prestigious university. Although prior to Snowden’s disclosures, many experts were aware --
or at least reasonably certain -- that the U.S. government was involved
in hacking against China, Washington was able to maintain official
deniability. Protected from major criticism, U.S. officials were
planning a major public relations campaign to pressure China into
tamping down its illicit activities in cyberspace, starting with threats
and perhaps culminating in legal indictments of Chinese hackers.
Chinese officials, although well aware that the Americans were acting
hypocritically, avoided calling them out directly in order to prevent
further damage to the relationship. But Beijing’s logic changed after Snowden’s leaks. China suddenly had
every reason to push back publicly against U.S. hypocrisy. After all,
Washington could hardly take umbrage with Beijing for calling out U.S.
behavior confirmed by official U.S. documents. Indeed, the disclosures
left China with little choice but to respond publicly. If it did not
point out U.S. hypocrisy, its reticence would be interpreted as
weakness. At a news conference after the revelations, a spokesperson for
the Chinese Ministry of National Defense insisted that the scandal
“reveal[ed] the true face and hypocritical conduct regarding Internet
security” of the United States. The United States has found itself flatfooted. It may attempt, as the
former head of U.S. counterintelligence Joel Brenner has urged, to draw
distinctions between China’s allegedly unacceptable hacking, aimed at
stealing commercial secrets, and its own perfectly legitimate hacking of
military or other security-related targets. But those distinctions will
likely fall on deaf ears. Washington has been forced to abandon its
naming-and-shaming campaign against Chinese hacking. Manning’s and Snowden’s leaks mark the beginning of a new era in
which the U.S. government can no longer count on keeping its secret
behavior secret. Hundreds of thousands of Americans today have access to
classified documents that would embarrass the country if they were
publicly circulated. As the recent revelations show, in the age of the
cell-phone camera and the flash drive, even the most draconian laws and
reprisals will not prevent this information from leaking out. As a
result, Washington faces what can be described as an accelerating
hypocrisy collapse -- a dramatic narrowing of the country’s room to
maneuver between its stated aspirations and its sometimes sordid pursuit
of self-interest. The U.S. government, its friends, and its foes can no
longer plausibly deny the dark side of U.S. foreign policy and will
have to address it head-on. SUIT THE ACTION TO THE WORD, THE WORD TO THE ACTION The collapse of hypocrisy presents the United States with
uncomfortable choices. One way or another, its policy and its rhetoric
will have to move closer to each other. The easiest course for the U.S. government to take would be to forgo
hypocritical rhetoric altogether and acknowledge the narrowly
self-interested goals of many of its actions. Leaks would be much less
embarrassing -- and less damaging -- if they only confirmed what
Washington had already stated its policies to be. Indeed, the United
States could take a page out of China’s and Russia’s playbooks: instead
of framing their behavior in terms of the common good, those countries
decry anything that they see as infringing on their national sovereignty
and assert their prerogative to pursue their interests at will.
Washington could do the same, while continuing to punish leakers with
harsh prison sentences and threatening countries that might give them
refuge. The problem with this course, however, is that U.S. national
interests are inextricably bound up with a global system of multilateral
ties and relative openness. Washington has already undermined its
commitment to liberalism by suggesting that it will retaliate
economically against countries that offer safe haven to leakers. If the
United States abandoned the rhetoric of mutual good, it would signal to
the world that it was no longer committed to the order it leads. As
other countries followed its example and retreated to the defense of
naked self-interest, the bonds of trade and cooperation that Washington
has spent decades building could unravel. The United States would not
prosper in a world where everyone thought about international
cooperation in the way that Putin does. A better alternative would be for Washington to pivot in the opposite
direction, acting in ways more compatible with its rhetoric. This
approach would also be costly and imperfect, for in international
politics, ideals and interests will often clash. But the U.S. government
can certainly afford to roll back some of its hypocritical behavior
without compromising national security. A double standard on torture, a
near indifference to casualties among non-American civilians, the gross
expansion of the surveillance state -- none of these is crucial to the
country’s well-being, and in some cases, they undermine it. Although the
current administration has curtailed some of the abuses of its
predecessors, it still has a long way to go.
Secrecy can be defended as a policy in a democracy. Blatant hypocrisy
is a tougher sell. Voters accept that they cannot know everything that
their government does, but they do not like being lied to. If the United
States is to reduce its dangerous dependence on doublespeak, it will
have to submit to real oversight and an open democratic debate about its
policies. The era of easy hypocrisy is over.
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