By Emin Sevdimaliyev

After the end of the Second Karabakh War, the Armenian government is looking for opportunities to revise the concept of foreign policy. If until September 2020 Yerevan was confident that Russia and the CSTO countries would come to the rescue and realize Armenia's foreign policy ambitions with the lives of their soldiers, then during and after the 44-day war, this hope dissipated.

As a result, the Second Karabakh War led to two significant changes in Armenia's foreign policy. Firstly, the fundamental element of the political discourse of Armenia that the so-called "artsakh" will never be part of Azerbaijan. This was a very significant event, since this event single-handedly changed the social context in Armenia, which led to the fragmentation of political forces and the media. Today, looking at the abundance of political remarks in the capital, as well as the liberties that local media allow themselves when using various epithets regarding the head of government, it becomes clear that Armenia continues to suffer from a split in society caused by political reasons.

The split, in itself, is not news, we have already touched on it. One of the reasons that led to it was indicated above, but this phenomenon has another reason.

The second reason that led to the split is the uncertainty in the security context. The Armenian society, like a number of politicians, believes that after the defeat in the war, Armenia is not able to ensure its security. Indeed, Armenia has the weakest army in the region, but the ability of the army is only one of the factors that determines whether or not a country can ensure its security. In this context, there is no need to remind the reader of the significant losses, both human and technical, during the Second Karabakh War.

The second element that emphasizes the level of power of the country is the combination of economic potential and population. From this point of view, Armenia cannot claim leadership, as the country's economy is very backward. As for the demographic situation, it is deplorable. Armenia is suffering from a rapid population decline, and this trend has not changed for a long time.

The last point, but no less important, is diplomacy. This topic is especially interesting, since Armenian diplomacy is based on one instinct - the guarantee of its security. We have already written about the fact that Yerevan failed to build a multi-vector diplomacy, modeled in the image and likeness of Azerbaijan.

If we develop the theme of the transformation of Armenian diplomacy, then one of the latest attempts of Armenia is rapprochement with India and Iran. Why these countries and what are the goals of this partnership?

The power balance in the region

The development of relations between Yerevan, Delhi and Tehran can be best explained by viewing this partnership as an attempt to create a force that will help Armenia create a counterbalance to the relations between Azerbaijan, Turkiye and Pakistan.

The "triangle" in which Armenia participates was easy to create for two reasons. The first reason is antagonism. Relations between Azerbaijan and Turkiye, on the one hand, and Iran, on the other, are going through hard times. Also, the level of relations between India and Pakistan is known to all. From this point of view, Iran and India were able to advance their interests in the region with the help of Yerevan, which gave them such an opportunity.

The problem for Armenia is that neither India nor Iran will fight instead of Armenia, and the ruling elites in Yerevan should be clearly aware of this. Certainly, for its favor. Delhi and Tehran consider this partnership strictly as a relationship with a "junior in rank", there can be no question of any equality. Iran is unable to afford another adventure, as Tehran has made too many enemies in the region. Secondly, Iran suffers from the fragmentation of society as much as Yerevan. Suffice it to recall the large-scale protests that shook Iran, as well as the celebration of the defeat of the national team during the World Cup from the United States.

As for India, this dynamically developing country will not risk its image for the dubious benefit of participating in the schemes planned by Yerevan.

Temporary partnership, not long-term alliance

This rapprochement is actually situational, where Tehran and Delhi are more interested in promoting personal interests, while the partnership with Armenia is a by-product. The key to unraveling and understanding the situation lies in the North-South transport corridor, which has become relevant again thanks to the political changes that have taken place over the past year.

Delhi and Tehran have a common interest in this endeavor. Delhi is trying to gain access to new markets for goods and services. To do this, India needs a transport route that will pass through Iran. This will allow India to significantly improve its trade balance and strengthen trade relations with its partners.

In turn, Tehran is trying to establish a transport route through Armenia. The potential establishment of this route is a more important reason for the creation of this alliance. The only problem is that the railway route from Iran to Armenia exists only on paper, and it is economically unprofitable to organize the movement of such a volume of goods using road transport. Plus, there is still no clarity about the mechanism for financing the railway, about who will become its operator and what the "finished product" will look like.

Which brings us to the numbers. The cost of laying a railway, depending on a combination of factors such as territory, materials and technology, can vary from 1 to 3 million US dollars per kilometer. According to official data, the parties need to lay 382 kilometers of railway communication. This means that the amount of the project can vary from 382 million to 1.1 billion. And these are only the expenses for the construction of the railway line from Iran to Armenia. Next, it will be necessary to ensure the movement of goods to Georgia, and then to Russia. Thus, efficiency will drop as one more border has to be crossed, which increases travel time, costs and paperwork. Another question - when will all this be ready? The implementation of such large-scale projects takes a long time, and Delhi will not wait forever.

From this point of view, the union being promoted does not seem realistic for two reasons. First, it was created because of emotional, not rational impulses. Sooner or later, one of the participants will lose interest in the project, and it is very likely that it will be India. Also, the irrationality of the project is indicated by the fact that the countries participating in the project can achieve more beneficial transport cooperation within the North-South corridor, due to the more advantageous location of Azerbaijan.

As for security issues, Armenia may receive some guarantees on paper, but neither Tehran, nor Delhi, will provide real support to Yerevan. The payoff for the risk they take is too doubtful. And if it comes to this, then both capitals, with a huge degree of probability, will minimize their losses and refuse direct support.

This "alliance" is temporary and situational and will not allow Armenia to strengthen its sovereignty. For a simple reason - Armenia does not solve the issue, which is the root of its troubles. And the root of the trouble is that Yerevan does not comply with international law. Until Armenia changes the existing model of behavior, it will have to continue searching in vain for defenders among more powerful states. But each of these countries, to some extent or another, is also connected with Azerbaijan, which will not give them the opportunity to openly go to aggression against Baku.

After all, if France, which has always sworn eternal love to Armenia, did not support it by action, but only by word, why would any other country do this?