April battles: the shame of the Armenian army and the triumph of Azerbaijan

These days mark the 9th anniversary of the April 2016 fighting. The first step towards the liberation of the occupied territories of Azerbaijan, after which a military solution to the conflict no longer seemed impossible to Armenia and its supporters.

The Armenian media has been howling and crying for the third day, commemorating the "heroes" who, they say, did not allow, stopped, defeated, and so on. Such an interpretation of those events looks completely meaningless today, but Armenians are no strangers to honoring far-fetched "heroes" and "victories" that did not exist. Agitprop is still trying to convince the Armenian society that nine years ago, illegal armed separatist formations and units of the Armenian Armed Forces won some kind of victory and "stopped the aggression." No one wants to tell the truth, because after the disaster of 2020, Armenian society needs to be inspired by something. Everything is thoroughly known about the 44-day war, but the truth about the April battles is still being hidden so that the "descendants of Noah" have at least some illusions.

What do the Armenian media write about in connection with the anniversary of the so-called four-day war? About how the "iron Ashots" heroically held back the enemy who was ten times stronger in strength and stood to the last. The Armenians will not be told that the "tenfold" superiority appeared when the Armenian military fled. The "Warriors of Light" ran so fast that they overtook the locals, who also rushed as fast as they could towards Armenia. The situation was so shameful that military police posts had to be set up on the roads to detain and return deserters to their positions.

"Atrocities" are described in the Armenian media, and, according to tradition, a tear is squeezed out. The authors of the statements and articles are trying their best to inspire the reader. Ex-Ombudsman Arman Tatoyan made racist and revanchist statements. He called the April battles "a symbol of the strength of the national spirit and the purity of the Armenian identity" and called for educating new generations on this "feat." However, the racist Tatoyan, concerned about the purity of the Armenian identity, could not explain why everything ended so badly for the occupiers. Agitprop really wants Armenians to think that in April 2016, the invaders managed to repel the offensive of the Azerbaijani army. The opposition, revanchists and fugitive separatists use those events as an example for Pashinyan. They say that the Armenian authorities of that time were, sorry, with eggs, but he, Pashitnyan, was without. The Karabakh clan, according to opposition propaganda, prevented in 2016 what Pashinyan failed to prevent in 2020.

We'll have to disappoint the neighbors. No large-scale offensive was planned in April 2016. It was planned to secure settlements near the former line of contact and teach a lesson to the occupiers. And this goal was fulfilled. Subsequently, the Armenian military and experts vied to convince that the Azerbaijani side had failed to take any important positions, and that thanks to engineering work, the Armenians were able to offset the successes of the Azerbaijani army. In particular, much has been said about the strategic height of Leletepe. It was claimed that it had no serious significance, that we were inflating the issue here, but in fact it was just a mound. But no one explains why hundreds of Armenian soldiers died behind "some hillock", why the occupying army clung to Leletepe with its teeth, trying to prevent the Azerbaijanis from getting the height.

I remember there was a report in the Armenian Sputnik, with a touch of irony. The journalist expected to see Everest, but he saw... "And that's it?" Everything, however, for "and that's it" there were a lot of Armenian corpses on the hillsides. If the military leadership of Armenia and the illegal separatist gangs believed that the height of Leletepe was not important, then why did they send their soldiers to their deaths? By the way, the importance of this position is evidenced by the fact that even before the April fighting, the occupiers themselves increased the height of the hill, "filling it up". Why? Because from this position, a significant area could be viewed and many Azerbaijani settlements could be kept under targeted fire. The same village of Jojug Marjanli, which, although it was cleared of invaders in 1993, remained uninhabited, as it was controlled by Armenians from Leletepe. By liberating the heights, the Azerbaijani army was able to keep significant territories under surveillance, as well as the military logistics of the occupiers.

So there were no "unimportant" losses for Armenia in April 2016. In general, more than 2,000 hectares of land in the territories of the Fizuli, Jabrayil and Agder districts were liberated from the invaders. In contrast to the reassuring statements of Serzh Sargsyan and Co., the opposition argued that Armenia had lost not "insignificant" positions, but 7 million square meters of strategically important territories that needed to be returned immediately in order to avoid serious problems in the future.

After the April fighting, and especially after Nikol Pashinyan came to power, the bravura chatter began to wane. In May 2019, instead of solemn speeches and glorification of the "warriors of light," Pashinyan stated that "the time has come to create a parliamentary commission to investigate the causes of the events of April 2016 and receive answers to a number of questions that concern us." The new government was unlikely to seek to find out the truth. The goal was to bury the opposition, rip off its "heroic" aura and show the Armenians the true face of the Karabakh clan. In principle, this is also a good goal. But the answer to the question of why Armenia lost in April 2016 did not require any proceedings or commissions. He always lay on the surface.

By the way, during the Second Karabakh War, the Armenian army, on Pashinyan's personal instructions, attempted to retake the "unimportant" height of Leletepe at any cost. The Armenian Prime Minister really wanted to show that he had managed to regain the height that the previous authorities had squandered. I wanted the best, but it turned out as always. According to Armenian experts, on October 6, 2020, the Supreme Commander-in-chief decided to recapture Leleltepe. As a result, Armenia lost the remnants of military units in Jabrayil, tank units in Fuzuli and Khojaly, as well as most of the infantry, tank and artillery troops in the central defensive area of the occupation forces. In addition, Pashinyan's attempt to satisfy his ambitions ended with the death of 700 Armenian soldiers.

Nine years ago, the Armenian side found out how much. If it hadn't been for the mind-boggling propaganda, Yerevan would have become more serious about peace negotiations even then. But he always had intercessors and advisers who clearly did not wish the Armenians well.

Massive pressure began on Baku, and attempts were made to persuade Azerbaijan to make various decisions beneficial to the aggressor. Let us recall the wave of support for Armenia that arose after the April events. Yerevan's patrons tried to veto the possibility of using force in the future and force Baku to agree to strengthen the status quo. The then Armenian Foreign Minister Nalbandian told the media that agreements had been reached in Vienna and St. Petersburg to increase the number of observers and introduce trust mechanisms, "but Azerbaijan backed down again, saying that it did not agree on any issue." Initially, Nalbandian claimed that President Ilham Aliyev had signed the agreements, but then admitted that Aliyev had not signed anything in Vienna or St. Petersburg. Although the issue of so-called confidence-building mechanisms was discussed in Vienna, it was no longer on the agenda at the meeting in St. Petersburg, as Azerbaijan was under no circumstances going to allow the line of contact of troops to turn into a kind of "border" with the assignment of any rights to the occupiers. Before the withdrawal of the Armenian occupation forces from the occupied territories, there could be no question of any investigation mechanisms. This was the position of the President of Azerbaijan.

As for the expansion of the observer mission, which was discussed after the April fighting, Baku was initially not against it and work in this direction was indeed started, but was soon stopped. The fact is that Baku has agreed to expand the office of the personal representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, but not the mandate of observers. In July 2016, Azerbaijan agreed to expand the office if the mandate is not changed. However, a year later, the Azerbaijani mission to the OSCE issued a statement stating that "we encountered unacceptable elements on the line of contact of the troops in connection with the deployment of OSCE observers. This also means a change in the working style of the personal representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, which does not correspond to the agreements reached at the presidential level."

As a result, the issue of office expansion was suspended. Yerevan has failed to consolidate the results of the occupation with the help of international organizations.

The April fighting was a lesson not only for Armenia, but also for the international community. It was made clear to everyone that Azerbaijan is not going to put up with the occupation of its territories and is ready to give a decent response to the invaders at any moment. The Azerbaijani army is strong and capable of performing the most difficult task, and the "successes" of the occupiers achieved in the early 90s are only temporary.

The events of April 2016 are already a thing of the past, a fact of history. But we do not forget and we will never forget that this was the first step towards a great Victory.